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CERCLA ARRANGER LIABILITY IN THE EIGHTH 
CIRCUIT: UNITED STATES V. TIC INDUSTRIES 
Jay Sandvos* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA)l is a mess. The quagmire of CERCLA in-
terpretation and enforcement stands as an ironic metaphor for the 
toxic waste sites CERCLA is meant to address.2 As a result of CER-
CLA's intrinsic problems,3 courts often have failed to focus clearly on 
the legal issues CERCLA brings before them.4 Like CERCLA itself, 
the line of CERCLA legal decisions is ambiguous, contradictory, and 
often demonstrates a poorly conceived understanding of how to apply 
CERCLA.5 
* Clincial Placement Director, Articles Editor, 1996--1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA),42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994). 
2 See Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner arul Operator Analysis Under CERCLk 
Firuling Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 223, 223 nn.2-3 (1994) 
[hereinafter Oswald, Bifurcation of Owner and Operator 1 (listing many courts and commenta-
tors criticizing CERCLA's vague, ambiguous provisions, threadbare legislative history, and 
inconsistent implementation by courts). 
3 See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(CERCLA is "notorious for its lack of clarity and poor draftsmanship"); United States V. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) [herein-
after NEPACCO 1] (CERCLA is "marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions."), rev'd 
in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter NEPACCO 11]. 
4 See United States V. Cordova Chern. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir.) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion that parent corporations were not directly liable under 
CERCLA for begging question of exactly how liability does exist under CERCLA), vacated, 
reh'g en banc granted, 67 F.3d 586 (1995). 
5 This point is illustrated by the issue of when and how to impose liability on parent corpora-
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One fundamental problem of CERCLA interpretation is how to 
harmonize CERCLA's broad scheme of strict, joint, and severalliabil-
ity with the primary canons of torts and corporations law on which 
the statute overlays.6 One of the greatest attractions to potential 
investors in a corporation is that their personal liability is limited to 
the amount of their investment.7 Limited liability-a basic principle 
of corporations law-protects shareholders, officers, and employees 
from personal liability for the debts or liabilities of the corporation 
unless they personally participated in the liability-creating conduct.s 
Without a clear statement of congressional intent to override such 
fundamentals of pre-existing law, judicial interpretation of CERCLA 
should be tailored carefully to avoid conflicting with limited liability, 
a cardinal principle of corporations law.9 
tions for the hazardous waste disposal problems caused by their subsidiaries. The Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits have held that a parent corporation can be held liable for CERCLA violations of 
its subsidiary only if the circumstances are met for piercing the corporate veil. See Joslyn Mfg. 
Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990); Cardova, 59 F.3d at 590. The First, Third, 
and Eleventh Circuits would impose such liability directly, without piercing the corporate veil, 
on a parent corporation based on "active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary." United 
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d 
at 1221; Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993). The 
Ninth and Fourth Circuits would also impose liability on a parent corporation directly without 
piercing the corporate veil, but without any showing of actual involvement in the actions of the 
subsidiary, based upon their authority to control the activities of their subsidiary. See Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992); Nurad, Inc. 
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992). 
6 See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (highlighting the difficulty 
in determining liability under CERCLA by pointing out that § 107(a)(3) could be read literally 
so as to impose liability on individuals who "merely arrange for the transportation of hazardous 
waste but never actually do so"); see also Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and 
the "Erosion" of Traditional Corparate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259, 301 (1992) ("In 
considering the liability of parent corporations for the environmental torts of their subsidiaries, 
the issue is often whether the applicable standard of liability derives from common law princi-
ples of corporate law or from direct application of the statutory definitions of CERCLA."). 
7 See, e.g., Oswald, Bifurcation of Owner and Operatar, supra note 2, at 233 n.42 ("Under the 
doctrine of limited liability, the owner of a corporation is not liable for the corporation's debts. 
Creditors of the corporation have recourse only against the corporation itself, not against the 
parent company or shareholders. It is on this assumption that 'large undertakings are rested, 
vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital are attracted."') (citing United States 
v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1985»; see also HENRY BALLANTINE, CORPO-
RATIONS § 118 (rev. ed. 1946) ("The immunity of the shareholders from corporate obligations is 
one of the most important incidents and advantages of the separate legal entity, and serves a 
useful purpose in business life."). 
8 See, e.g., 3A WILLIAM F. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1137 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994); BALLANTINE, supra note 7, § 118; see also 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985). 
9 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 301. 
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Thus, the question of what standard of liability to apply under 
CERCLA aptly has been described as "how wide to cast the net."l0 
Most courts have imposed CERCLA liability on corporate officials 
consistent with CERCLA's explicit text and the corporate doctrine of 
limited liability-that is, only where that individual personally par-
ticipated in the action creating the liability.ll As a result, persons who 
in fact are responsible for the improper disposal of hazardous wastes, 
occasionally will escape liability for cleanup costs because it cannot be 
shown that they personally participated in the wrongful activity.12 
Thus, under the majority standard, the net of CERCLA liability is 
sometimes cast too narrowly.13 
A few courts have focussed on CERCLA's recognized goal of hold-
ing those responsible for improper disposal of hazardous wastes liable 
for the costs of the necessary cleanup.14 These courts have held cor-
porate officials liable under CERCLA based on the status of their 
position within the corporation and their authority to control the 
disposal of hazardous wastes.15 As a result, persons who have not 
actually participated in the improper disposal of hazardous wastes 
unfairly may be personally liable for cleanup costS.16 The minority 
10 See Donald M. Carley, Personal Liability of Officers Under CERCLA- How Wide a Net 
Has Been Cast?, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 235 (1994); see also United States v. Cordova 
Chern. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.) ("the widest net possible ought not be cast" to 
determine liability under CERCLA), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 67 F.3d 586 (1995); Oswald, 
Bifurcation of Owner and Operator, supra note 2, at 224 ("Congress cast a wide net in an effort 
to achieve its objectives."). 
11 See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In light of the established 
principle of limited liability that protects corporate officers or employees who do not actually 
participate in liability-creating conduct, there must be some basis in the statute itself, beyond 
its general purpose, to support the conclusion that Congress intended to impose liability on 
those who control the corporation's day-to-day activities."); Cordova, 59 F.3d at 590 ("We are 
not persuaded that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress contemplated the abandonment of tradi-
tional concepts of limited liability associated with the corporate form .... "); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. 
T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990) ("CERCLA does not define 'owners' or 
'operators' as including the parent company of offending wholly-owned subsidiaries. Nor does 
the legislative history indicate that Congress intended to alter so substantially basic a tenet of 
corporation law."). 
12 See United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 50 (1996). 
13 See id. 
14 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992); see also 
Oswald, Bifurcation of Owner and Operator, supra note 2, at 224. 
15 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089 (stating CERCLA liability may be imposed based on substantial 
indirect control of hazardous waste disposal); Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. 
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating CERCLA liability may be imposed based on 
authority to control hazardous waste disposal); Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842. 
16 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090 (effect of liability based solely on authority to control disposal of 
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approach, therefore, sometimes casts the net of CERCLA liability too 
widely.17 
The judicial struggle to interpret CERCLA has been led, from the 
beginning, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.Is The landmark cases of United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chemical Co., Inc. (NEPACCO Il)19 and United States 
v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals CO.20 created expansive liability for 
"arrangers" under CERCLA.2I More recently, the Eighth Circuit again 
struggled with the issue of CERCLA arranger liability for corporate 
officers and parent corporations in United States v. TIC Investment 
Corp. (TIC).22 In TIC, the Eighth Circuit held that a corporate officer 
without any personal participation in waste disposal decisions was 
liable as an arranger under CERCLA for the costs of cleaning up the 
corporation's hazardous wastes, disposed of at a nearby dump.23 The 
TIC court also held that a parent corporation, similarly, may be di-
rectly liable as an arranger under CERCLA for the hazardous waste 
disposal practices of its subsidiary.24 
Section II of this Comment provides an overview of CERCLA's 
structure and the standard of liability under CERCLA. Section III 
describes the development of CERCLA arranger liability in the Eighth 
Circuit and examines in some detail the circuit court's TIC opinion. 
Section IV analyzes the TIC opinion, explores some of the implica-
tions of its holding, and explains some of the problems with the Eighth 
hazardous wastes "is that any officer of a corporation who has contract authority can be held 
liable as a person who 'arranged for disposal' of that corporation's waste"); see also Lynda J. 
Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA- A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 636 (1993) (hereinafter Oswald, Strict Liability) (arguing that because 
of problems in CERCLA resulting from its poor drafting, courts should not apply statute too 
broadly, or individuals could be subjected to inappropriate or excessive liability). 
17 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090. 
18 The Western District of Missouri, in NEPACCO I, first addressed liability under CERCLA 
in the Eighth Circuit. NEPACCO I, supra note 3, at 847-50. In NEPACCO II, the Eighth 
Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to deal substantially with liability under CERCLA. 
See NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 742-46. 
19 NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 726. 
20 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
21 "Arranger" is the term referring to a party who is covered by § 107(a)(3) of CERCLA, 
which imposes liability on "any person who ... arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances 
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility ... owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3). 
22 68 F.3d 1082, 1086-93, (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 50 (1996). 
23 Id. at 1090-91. 
24 Id. at 1092. 
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Circuit's standard of CERCLA arranger liability under TIC, conclud-
ing that its standard of "actual or substantial control, directly or 
indirectly" unwisely follows a small minority of courts and imposes an 
overinclusive standard of CERCLA liability.25 
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
A. Historical Background 
By the late 1970s it was clear that improper handling and disposal 
of hazardous substances could result in substantial adverse effects to 
both the environment and to human populations.26 For example, con-
tamination by massive quantities of the pesticide Kepone resulted in 
the closing to fishing of 100 miles of the James River and its tributar-
ies in Virginia.27 In upstate New York, the tragic chemical contamina-
tion of the Love Canal area was connected with miscarriages, birth 
defects, and other health problems of nearby residents.28 
25 See id; United States v. Cordova Chern. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 594-96 (6th Cir.) (Ryan, 
J., dissenting) (citing split authority between circuit courts), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 67 
F.3d 586 (1995). 
26 See Carley, supra note 10, at 236 n.9 and accompanying text. 
2:l For a more detailed discussion of the James River Kepone incident, see William Goldfarb, 
Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENVTL. L. 645 (1978) (reprinted in PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 42 (1992)). According to 
Goldfarb, in 1966, the Allied Chemical Corp. began producing the pesticide Kepone in commer-
cial quantities at its Hopewell, Virginia plant. PLATER ET AL., supra, at 43. Allied decided to 
"toll" its production of Kepone in 1973. [d. at 44. Tolling is apparently a common arrangement 
in the chemical industry where a manufacturer sends its chemical product to another company 
to have it further processed. [d. The processing company receives a fee, or "toll", for its work 
and returns the final product to its original owner. [d. The classic example of this general type 
of business arrangement is a farmer sending his wheat to the mill and getting back flour. See 
id. Two of Allied's Kepone production manager's decided to form a corporation to bid on the 
Kepone tolling contract. [d. The newly formed corporation, Life Science Products Company 
(LSP), set itself up nearby in what had been a gasoline service station, and submitted a bid to 
produce Kepone, along with two other companies. [d. at 44-45. One of the other companies bid 
$3.00 per pound, but at 54 cents per pound, LSP's bid was by far the lowest. [d. at 44. LSP's 
appalling lack of safe work practices resulted in massive exposure of their workers to Kepone, 
a neurological poison in humans. [d. at 42, 47. After the workers required medical attention for 
their severe exposures, it also was discovered that massive quantities of Kepone had been 
released to the surrounding environment. [d. at 47--48. 
28 The Love Canal area was contaminated by more than 21,000 tons of hazardous chemical 
waste. Laurie Goodstein, Back to Love Canal: Resettling a Symbol of Toxic Waste Hazards, 
WASH. POST, June 12, 1990, at A3. After these substances were detected in nearby homes and 
neighborhoods, the responsible company was forced to pay over $20 million to settle the 
resulting civil claims. [d. 
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In response to these and similar incidents, a lame-duck Congress 
enacted CERCLA in 1980 with little legislative discussion, the rushed 
product of last-minute compromises.29 Congress tried to achieve two 
general goals in CERCLA: (1) to provide for cleanup if a hazardous 
substance is released into the environment or if such release is threat-
ened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these 
cleanups.3o Due to the circumstances surrounding its creation, CER-
CLA has been criticized, however, as possessing vague and contradic-
tory language that is not clarified by its sparse legislative history.31 
As a result, the courts have struggled in an effort to interpret CER-
CLA so as to accomplish its broad goals.32 
As enacted, § 107 of CERCLA imposes liability for hazardous waste 
cleanup costs on four categories of responsible persons: (1) current 
and past owners of hazardous waste facilities, (2) current and past 
operators of hazardous waste facilities, (3) any person who arranged 
for the transportation or disposal of hazardous wastes that they owned 
or possessed, and (4) any person who transported hazardous waste.33 
The statute uses the term "person" broadly to include corporate 
29 See, e.g., United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 821 n.19 (3d Cir. 1995) ("CERCLA was 
enacted on December 11, 1980 in the last days of the 96th Congress. The version ofthe Act was 
conceived by an ad hoc committee of Senators who fashioned a last minute compromise which 
enabled the Act to pass. As a result, the statute was hastily and inadequately drafted. The only 
legislative history on the compromise is found in the floor debates.") (citing United States v. A 
& F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984)). 
30 H.R. REP. No. 253 (III), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3038,3038. 
31 See id; Oswald, Bifurcation of Owner and Operator, supra note 2, at 223 n.3. (citing the 
complaints of many courts). 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Cordova Chern. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 593-96 (6th Cir.) (Ryan, 
J., dissenting) (reviewing conflicting interpretations between circuits regarding liability of 
parent corporations as CERCLA owners and operators under § 107 (a)(2)), vacated, reh'g en 
banc granted, 67 F.3d 586 (1995). 
33 CERCLA § 107(a) states in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of 
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, 
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 
containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted such hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
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entities as well as individuals.34 CERCLA's legislative history, how-
ever, does not indicate any congressional intent with respect to any 
potential liability of corporate officers or shareholders.35 
B. CERCLA's Liability Scheme 
1. Strict, Joint, and Several Liability 
Although CERCLA does not state explicitly a scheme of liability, 
courts consistently have interpreted CERCLA as creating strict, 
joint, and severalliability.36 Thus, without regard for notions of intent 
or fault, full liability for all cleanup costs extends to any person falling 
in one of the four categories of responsible parties.37 
2. The Majority Standard-Actual Control 
A great majority of courts require a showing of actual control over, 
or personal participation in,38 the disposal of hazardous wastes to 
impose liability under CERCLA.39 A clear example of this approach 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable .... 
42 u.s.c. § 9607(a). 
34 "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consor-
tium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commis-
sion, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 
35 See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 821 n.20 (3d Cir. 1995). At least one commen-
tator has noted that "[s]ome environmental statutes ... specifically name officers, agents, and/or 
shareholders as potentially liable parties, while still others refer directly to 'responsible corpo-
rate officers.'" Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 16, at 586 n.29. 
36 See NEPACCO I, supra note 3, at 843-45. 
37 Id. at 843-44. Section 107 (b) of CERCLA provides for three limited defenses to the strict 
liability provisions of subsection (a): an act of God, an act of war, and an act or omission of a 
third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Although the text of CERCLA does not state that this list of 
defenses is exclusive, the courts and commentators have treated it as such. See, e.g., Oswald, 
Bifurcation of Owner and Operator, supra note 2, at 230 ("[t]he statute permits only three 
narrow defenses .... "). 
38 Regardless of whether a given court prefers the phrase "personal participation" or "actual 
control," the same standard and analysis applies. Compare Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. 
International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (CERCLA liability requires 
"personal participation") with Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 
(11th Cir. 1993) (CERCLA liability requires "actual and pervasive control") and USX Corp., 68 
F.3d at 825 (application of actual control liability standard requires "actual participation" in 
liability creating conduct). 
39 The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all require that liability under 
CERCLA be based on actual control over the handling of hazardous wastes. See USX Corp., 
68 F.3d at 825 ("there must be a showing that the person sought to be held liable actually 
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is the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in United States v. USX COrp.40 The USX court analyzed the 
liability of hazardous waste "transporters" under CERCLA § 107(a)(4) 
and rejected the government's argument that transporter liability 
should be based upon control over general corporate affairs rather 
than actual participation in the liability-creating conduct.41 The court 
stated that interpreting CERCLA so as to conflict with the traditional 
limited liability concepts of corporate law would be improper without 
specific indication from Congress that such was its intent.42 
The USX court also provided a cogent discussion of the structural 
differences in the four categories of CERCLA liability.43 It noted that 
the government's argument was based on cases involving liability 
under §§ 107(a)(1) and (a)(2) which impose liability based on the status 
of ownership or operation of a hazardous waste facility.44 Liability of 
arrangers and transporters under §§ 107(a)(3) and (a)(4) was struc-
tured differently, however, by requiring specific conduct to impose 
liability, not mere status.45 Consequently, the USX court adopted the 
actual control standard and held that liability of hazardous waste 
transporters under § 107(a)(4), and by implication also of arrangers 
under § 107(a)(3), required a showing of actual participation in the 
liability-creating conduct.46 
3. The Minority Standard-Authority to Control 
A minority viewpoint surfaced in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. 
Hooper & Sons CO.47 The Nurad court imposed liability under CER-
participated in the liability creating conduct"); Sidney S. Arst, Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. 
Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[a]ctual participation in, or exercise of specific control 
of, the activities in question must be shown"); Jacksonville Elec., 996 F.2d at 1110 (imposing 
CERCLA liability only where "actual and pervasive control" is present); Riverside Market, 931 
F.2d at 330 ("[i]n determining liability ... we must look to the extent of the defendant's personal 
participation in the alleged wrongful conduct"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 
24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) ("At a minimum [CERCLA liability] requires active involvement in the 
activities."). 
40 USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 824 n.25. 
41 [d. at 825. 
42 See id. at 824. 
43 [d. 
44 [d. at 824 n.25. 
45 USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 825. 
46 [d. 
47 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit, in dicta, has also adopted the example 
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CLA based on authority to control the disposal of hazardous wastes.48 
The court did not demand proof that the defendant actually partici-
pated in the disposal of hazardous wastes, but only required a showing 
that the defendant could have controlled the disposal.49 
Besides the Fourth Circuit, only the Ninth Circuit, in dicta, has 
indicated a willingness to embrace the authority to control standard.5O 
The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted 
the actual control standard, requiring proof of actual participation in 
the disposal of hazardous wastes before imposing liability for cleanup 
costS.51 The Eighth Circuit seems to have had difficulty deciding on a 
clear liability standard.52 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CERCLA ARRANGER 
LIABILITY IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
A. NEPACCO II-The First Step 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first 
interpreted liability of "arrangers" under CERCLA in NEPACCO 
II,53 which contained language seeming to embrace both actual control 
and authority to control as standards of liability. 54 NEPACCO II is 
therefore worth considering in some detail. 
NEPACCO's manufacturing of the disinfectant hexachlorophene 
resulted in the production of hazardous waste products, including 
dioxin.55 Some of these hazardous wastes were deposited in fifty-five 
gallon drums that were stored at the manufacturing plant.56 In 1971, 
of Nurad and its authority to control liability standard, stating that CERCLA liability "only 
attaches if the defendant had authority to control the cause of the contamination at the time 
the hazardous substances were released into the environment." Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Co. 
v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992). 
48 Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842. 
49Id. 
50 Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d at 1341 (stating CERCLA liability "only attaches if the defen-
dant had authority to control the cause of the contamination at the time the hazardous sub-
stances were released into the environment"). 
51 See supra note 39. 
62 See, e.g., NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 743-44 (stating that authority to control is critical, 
but imposing liability based on defendant's actual control of the disposal of hazardous wastes). 
53 See id. at 743. 
54 See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1994) (CERCLA liability in 
NEPACCO II based on "two closely related but distinct grounds: that the individual had 'actual 
control' of the hazardous substances and that he had 'authority to control' their disposal"). 
65 NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 729-30. 
66 Id. at 730. 
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a shift manager at the plant proposed to dispose ofthe fifty-five gallon 
drums at a nearby farmP The plant's supervisor, a vice-president 
of NEPACCO, approved the disposal plan, and the shift supervisor 
dumped eighty-five of the drums in a trench on the farm.58 
The vice-president was held liable as an arranger under CERCLA 
§ l07(a)(3), based on his having actual control over the arrangement 
to dispose of the hazardous wastes at the farm.59 The vice-president 
"actually knew about, had immediate supervision over, and was di-
rectly responsible for arranging for the transportation and disposal of 
the NEPACCO plant's hazardous substances" at the farm site.60 Since 
the vice-president's liability was based on his actual participation in 
the arrangements to dispose of the hazardous wastes, NEPACCO II 
seems to be adopting the actual control liability standard.61 
NEPACCO Irs discussion can be confusing, however, because of its 
rejection of the vice-president's argument that he did not personally 
"own or possess" the hazardous substances, but that NEPACCO as a 
corporate entity actually owned the wastes.62 The NEPACCO II court 
accepted the government's argument that the vice-president's actual 
control over the hazardous substances satisfied the possession lan-
guage of § 107(a)(3).63 The court reasoned that the broad remedial 
purposes of CERCLA were inconsistent with the vice-president's 
proposed narrow interpretation requiring proof of personal owner-
ship or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a pre-
requisite for arranger liability.64 The court held that "[i]t is the author-
ity to control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances that 
is critical under the statutory scheme."65 With careful reading, it seems 
clear that the "authority to control" language of the NEPACCO II 
opinion is not directed towards overall arranger liability, but that it 
is only addressed to the vice-president's argument regarding the 
"owned or possessed" phrase which forms a small part of § l07(a)(3).66 
57Id. 
58 Id. 
69Id. at 743. 
60 NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 744. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. at 743. 
63 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (imposing arranger liability on "any person who ... arranged 
for disposal ... of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party 
or entity, at any facility ... owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such 
hazardous substances.") (emphasis added). 
64 NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 743. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. Other facts of the case also provide circumstantial evidence that authority to control 
was not the overall standard of liability in NEPACCO II. NEPACCO's president, who was its 
1997] CERCLA ARRANGER LIABILITY 873 
NEPACCO Irs discussion of both actual control and authority to 
control was clumsy enough that subsequent decisions have had to 
revisit, reinterpret, and reclarify NEPACCO II.67 
B. United States v. Aceto 
The Eighth Circuit next discussed CERCLA arranger liability in 
United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals CO.68 Aceto and the 
other defendants argued that under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint 
were insufficient to state a claim under CERCLA § 107(a)(3) where 
they contracted with Aidex Corp. to formulate their technical-grade 
pesticides into commercial-grade pesticides.69 As a result of extensive 
contamination of the Aidex site by hazardous substances released 
during the formulation process, the United States and Iowa incurred 
response costs that they sought to recover from Aceto and its co-de-
fendants.7o 
The defendants focussed on their relationship to Aidex.71 They ar-
gued that they had hired Aidex to "formulate, not dispose" of the 
chemicals.72 Aceto claimed that any hazardous wastes produced be-
longed to Aidex, which also had control over the disposal of the 
wastes.73 The argument continued that because Aceto lacked the author-
ity to control Aidex's processing of the substances, as required by the 
NEPACCO II opinion, the defendants should not be held liable.74 
The court rejected this argument, however, as incompatible with 
CERCLA's goal of holding those responsible for harmful conditions 
major shareholder, was also found liable for cleanup costs, but under § 7003(a) of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) rather than under CERCLA. [d. at 745. If 
authority to control the disposal of hazardous wastes had been sufficient to impose arranger 
liability in NEPACCO II, then NEPACCO's president should also have been liable under 
CERCLA § 107(a)(3). See id. at 742 n.6. Like the vice-president who was held liable as an 
arranger, the president was aware of the necessity to arrange for the handling and disposal of 
NEPACCO's hazardous waste products, and possessed the actual authority to control such 
handling and disposal. See id. at 729-30. The government, however, did not argue, nor did the 
court discuss, the president's liability as an arranger under CERCLA § 107(a)(3). See id. at 
742 n.6. 
67 See id. at 745; United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1994); United States V. Vertac Chern. 
Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1995). 
68 Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1373. 
69 [d. at 1375. 
70 [d. at 1376. 
71 See id. at 1379. 
72 [d. 
73 Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379. 
74 [d. at 1381-82. 
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resulting from hazardous waste liable for the costs of the ensuing 
cleanup.75 The court, therefore, looked beyond defendants' charac-
terization of the disputed transaction and instead examined the actual 
nature of the relationship between the defendants and Aidex.76 De-
fendants owned the pesticides throughout the process Aidex per-
formed, which was under the direction of, and for the benefit of, the 
defendants.77 Furthermore, the court accepted the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the generation of pesticide-containing wastes was inherent 
in the pesticide formulation process and Aidex could not formulate 
Aceto's pesticides without wasting and disposing of a portion of them.78 
Thus, in order adequately to state a claim, an arrangement for the 
disposal of hazardous wastes could be implicit within Aceto's contract 
with Aidex.79 
The Aceto opinion also addressed the court's holding in NEPACCO 
II.80 Although the court in NEPACCO II had stated that "[i]t is the 
authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances 
that is critical under the statutory scheme," the Aceto court clarified 
that this language was in response to the argument that arranger 
liability attached only to individuals who actually owned or possessed 
such wastes.8! When, as in Aceto, possession or ownership was undis-
puted, the authority to control test did not apply to arranger liability.82 
Thus, the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants had ar-
ranged for the disposal of hazardous substances. 
Although Aceto appeared to clarify that authority to control was 
not the overall standard for arranger liability under CERCLA, sig-
nificant questions remained as to what the standard of liability actu-
ally was.83 Near the end of Aceto's discussion of CERCLA liability, 
the court stated that "[a]ny other decision, under the circumstances 
of this case, would allow defendants to simply 'close their eyes' to the 
method of disposal of their hazardous SUbstances, a result contrary to 
75 [d. at 1380-81. 
76 [d. at 1381 ("Aidex is performing a process on products owned by defendants for defendants' 
benefit and at their direction; waste is generated and disposed of contemporaneously with the 
process."). 
77 See id. 
78 Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379. 
79 See id. at 1382. 
80 [d. at 1381-82. 
81 [d. 
82 [d. 
83 For instance, the Eighth Circuit in Aceto never discussed what the criteria was to satisfy 
the "arranged for" language of CERCLA § 107(a)(3). See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378-82. 
1997] CERCLA ARRANGER LIABILITY 875 
the policies underlying CERCLA."84 That phrase seemed to imply 
that CERCLA does more than create liability for improper waste 
disposal. Rather, CERCLA imposes an active duty to prevent im-
proper disposal of hazardous wastes.85 Ultimately, it remained unclear 
after Aceto whether or not the Eighth Circuit required actual control 
of the wrongful activity to impose liability under CERCLA.86 
C. United States v. Vertac 
More recently, in United States v. Vertae Chemical Corp., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit revisited its ruling in 
NEPACCO II, holding that mere authority to control disposal or 
treatment does not, in and of itself, establish arranger liability.87 The 
court specifically held that the United States was not liable as an 
arranger for cleanup costs at a facility that had, under contract with 
the government, produced Agent Orange during the Vietnam War.88 
The court noted that NEPACCO II had involved the question of 
ownership or possession of hazardous substances by a corporate em-
ployee with respect to liability as an arranger under CERCLA.89 The 
Vertae court characterized NEPACCO II as concluding that a corpo-
rate officer "constructively possessed" the company's hazardous wastes 
because he "actually knew about, had immediate supervision over, and 
was directly responsible for arranging for the transportation and 
disposal" of the hazardous substances.90 
Unlike the defendant in NEPACCO II, however, the United States, 
in Vertae, did not immediately supervise or have direct responsibility 
for the transportation or disposal of the hazardous wastes produced 
at the facility.91 Also, unlike the defendants in Aceto, the United States 
did not supply the raw materials to the facility in Vertae, nor did it 
own or possess the raw materials or the work in progress.92 In con-
84 Id. at 1382 (citing United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985)). 
85 See id. 
B6 See id. 
87 United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing liability of 
a government entity with statutory or regulatory authority to control the disposal of hazardous 
waste: "[o]ur holding in NEPACCO, when read in the context of the facts of the case, certainly 
does not suggest such a broad interpretation."). 
B8 Id. at 807, 811. 
89 Id. at 810. 
90 Id. (citing NEPACCO, supra note 3, at 743). 
91Id. 
92 Vertae, 46 F.3d at 811. 
876 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:863 
tracting to buy the Agent Orange produced at the facility, the United 
States did not, therefore, arrange for the disposal of the hazardous 
wastes resulting from the production of the Agent Orange.93 
Again, in Vertae, the Eighth Circuit based its analysis regarding 
CERCLA arranger liability, in great part, on the question of satisfy-
ing the "owned or possessed" phrase of § 107(a)(3).94 In the line of 
cases from NEPACCO II, to Aceto, through Vertae, the Eighth Cir-
cuit never squarely confronted what constitutes "arranged for dis-
posal or treatment" within the meaning of § 107(a)(3).95 
D. United States v. Gurley 
In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
also addressed CERCLA liability in United States v. Gurley, this time 
regarding liability under CERCLA § 107(a)(2) as an "operator."96 The 
Gurley court first surveyed existing case law on the issue and ob-
served that the Fourth Circuit would impose CERCLA liability based 
only on a showing of authority to control the disposal of hazardous 
substances.97 However, the court noted that several circuits required 
proof of personal participation in, or actual control over, the disposal 
of hazardous substances.98 The Gurley court also remarked that, un-
less an individual was acting ultra vires, having actual control over 
the disposal of hazardous wastes encompassed having authority to 
control that disposal.99 In addition, the dictionary definitions of the 
term "operator," the court noted, "connote some type of action or 
affirmative conduct, an element not required by those courts that ask 
only whether a defendant had the authority to control the operation 
of the facility."l()O Based on its analysis, and reasoning that its decision 
93Id. 
94 Id. at 810-11 ("a governmental entity cannot be found to have owned or possessed hazard-
ous substances under § 9607(a)(3) merely because it had statutory or regulatory authority to 
control activities ... the United States did not own or possess the raw materials or the work 
in process ... [i]t also cannot reasonably be inferred that the United States constructively 
owned or possessed the raw materials or the work in process"). 
95 See generally supra notes 53-94 and accompanying text. 
96 United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1994). 
!YI Id. at 1193 (citing United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992»). 
98 Id. at 1192-93 (citing Sidney S. Arst, Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 
421 (7th Cir. 1994); Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 
327,330 (5th Cir. 1991); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985». 
99 Id. at 1193. 
1°OId. 
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was analogous to that in NEPACCO II, the Gurley court followed the 
majority rule101 in requiring actual control over the disposal of hazard-
ous wastes to impose liability under CERCLA.102 
After Gurley, the Eighth Circuit seemed fully to have rejected 
authority to control the disposal of hazardous wastes as sufficient to 
impose liability under CERCLA.l03 However, the Gurley court was 
addressing liability of operators under § 107(a)(2) rather than arrang-
ers under § 107(a)(3), as in the NEPACCO II - Aceto - Vertac line of 
cases.104 As a result, the Eighth Circuit had still not reached the 
question of what constitutes "arranged for disposal or treatment" 
within the meaning of § 107(a)(3) of CERCLA.105 The court finally 
reached this issue in United States v. TIC Investment COrp.l06 
E. United States v. TIC-Liability based on "actual or 
substantial control, directly or indirectly" 
1. Basic Facts and Procedural History 
The White Farm Equipment Co. (WFE) owned and operated a 
farm implement manufacturing plant in Iowa from 1971 until 1985.107 
WFE's plant produced hazardous wastes which were disposed of at a 
nearby dumpsite.108 Between 1980 and 1985, WFE was a wholly owned 
subsidiary, first of TIC Investment Corp. (TICI), then of TIC United 
Corp. (TICU).109 Stratton Georgoulis was the sole shareholder of both 
TICI and TICU, and also served as the president and chairman of the 
board of both.no In addition, Georgoulis was chairman of the board of 
WFE, and for some of the time in question served as its president.111 
101 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
102 Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1193. 
103 See United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 811 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989); NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 
744. 
104 See Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1192; Vertac, 46 F.3d at 810; Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1376; NEPACCO II, 
supra note 3, at 743. 
105 See Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1193; Vertac, 46 F.3d at 811; Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382; NEPACCO II, 
supra note 3, at 744. 
106 United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 50 (1996). 
107 I d. at 1084. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1084. 
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During this period, Georgoulis had authority to control, and did in fact 
directly or indirectly control "virtually every aspect of WFE's opera-
tions."112 However, for purposes of the appeal, the court assumed that 
neither Georgoulis nor any other employee of TICI or TICU was 
personally aware of WFE's waste disposal practices.113 
WFE defaulted on loans and was purchased after foreclosure in 
1985 by Allied Products Corp.114 In 1988, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency placed the dump site on the National Priorities List115 and, 
together with Allied, began remediation.116 To recover remediation 
costs pursuant to CERCLA, the United States and Allied sued Geor-
goulis, TIC I and TICU.ll7 After cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa 
ruled in favor of the government and held in partial summary judg-
ment that all three defendants were liable directly under CERCLA 
§ 107(a)(3) as "arrangers" of hazardous waste disposal.118 On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
arranger liability of Georgoulis, and remanded for further proceed-
ings on the question of TICI and TICU's arranger liability as parent 
corporations.119 
2. The Initial Framing of the Issues 
The TIC circuit opinion began by discussing the general nature of 
arranger liability under CERCLA.120 In this case, the court said, the 
ownership or possession of the hazardous substances disposed of at 
the dumpsite was not disputed because WFE was wholly owned by 
TICI and TICU at the time in question, and because Georgoulis was 
112Id. at 1090. 
113Id. at 1084. 
114 I d. at 1085. 
115Id. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) starts the CERCLA site evaluation 
process with a Hazard Ranking System which identifies, assesses, and ranks the hazards 
associated with contamination of a site by hazardous materials. See 40 C.F.R. § 300, App. A 
(1994). Then, the EPA lists the worst sites, in greatest need of attention, on the National 
Priorities List (NPL) in order to allocate the resources needed for the extensive cleanup. See 
42 U.S.C. § 9616; 40 C.F.R. § 300, App. B (1994). 
116 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1085. 
117 ld. 
118Id. Since the district court found the defendants "directly" liable as "persons" who ar-
ranged for disposal of hazardous wastes, neither the district court nor the reviewing circuit 
court discussed plaintiffs' alternative theory of defendants' arranger liability based upon the 
common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. ld. at 1085 n.2. 
119 ld. at 1093. 
12°ld. at 1085-86. 
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the sole shareholder of TIC I and TICU.l2l The only question, the court 
stated, was whether the defendants "arranged for" the disposal of 
hazardous substances at the dumpsite.122 
The Eighth Circuit next reviewed the trial court's reasoning in 
finding Georgoulis liable as an arranger.123 The trial court held that 
the standard to determine the liability of a corporate officer as an 
arranger under § 107(a)(3) was the same authority to control standard 
used to determine operator liability under § 107(a)(2).124 In addition, 
the trial court held, there must be a showing that this authority 
actually was used to control the operations of the corporation.125 The 
trial court concluded that Georgoulis both possessed the necessary 
authority to control all of the operations ofWFE, and made extensive 
use of that authority; therefore, Georgoulis was liable as an arranger.126 
Before beginning its own analysis, the circuit court also summa-
rized the defendants' arguments.127 The defendants contended that 
liability as an arranger required a showing of intent to arrange for 
121 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1086. Although the issue of ownership or possession was not disputed in 
this case, the court's premise seems open to dispute. See id. Corporate shareholders, as such, 
do not have the legal right to transfer the legal title to or the physical location of corporate 
assets. BALLANTINE, supra note 7, § 118. A person owning shares in a corporation which owns 
or possess hazardous substances is not the same thing as that person directly owning or 
possessing the hazardous substances. See id. In so far as the "owned or possessed" language of 
§ 107(a)(3) means "right to control" the hazardous substances, in the context of a corporation it 
should only be applicable to corporate officers and employees, and possibly the corporate 
directors, not, without more, the corporation's shareholders (or parent corporations) as such. 
See id. 
122 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1086. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. This part of both the district court's reasoning and the Eighth Circuit's characterization 
of that reasoning could seem to be contradictory in that, at first blush, the district court seems 
to be trying to apply both the authority to control standard and the actual control standard. See 
id; see also United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (N.D. Iowa 1994). 
Applying both standards would be logically meaningless, since, as noted by the Gurley court, 
unless an individual was acting ultra vires, having actual control over the disposal of hazardous 
wastes encompasses having authority to control that disposal. See United States v. Gurley, 43 
F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994). However, the district court's analysis is not addressing Geor-
goulis' authority to control or actual participation in arrangements for the disposal of WFE's 
hazardous wastes, but rather his general authority to control WFE itself and his actual partici-
pation in WFE's overall operations. See TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1180. The district court's require-
ment of authority to control WFE generally, plus actual exercise of that general authority over 
WFE, is not equivalent to requiring actual control over WFE's hazardous waste disposal 
arrangements. See id. As a practical matter, the district court's criteria amounts to authority to 
control the disposal of hazardous wastes. See id. 
126 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 118I. 
127 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1086-87. 
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disposal of a hazardous substance.128 Basically, the defendants argued 
for an actual control liability standard and proof of actual personal 
participation in WFE's hazardous waste disposal arrangements.129 
The defendants also attempted to reconcile previous Eighth Cir-
cuit decisions with their position.130 Notwithstanding the discussion in 
NEPACCO II regarding authority to control establishing possession 
of hazardous wastes, the defendants argued that liability as an ar-
ranger, in that case, actually had been imposed based on the defen-
dant's actual involvement in the waste disposal arrangement.131 In 
addition, the TIC defendants cited Gurley and Vertac as requiring 
actual control over the hazardous waste disposal to create liability 
under CERCLA.132 The defendants contended that Aceto was distin-
guishable because the issue in that case was whether or not an ar-
rangement between the parties was a disposal or a sale of the mate-
rials containing hazardous substances, whereas this case was about 
whether defendants "ever intentionally participated in any arrange-
ment."133 
3. The TIC Court's Analysis 
a. Interpretation of the Case Law 
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis of Georgoulis' liability by 
agreeing that Gurley and Vertac impose a requirement "of actual 
participation in or exercise of control over activities that are causally 
connected to, or have some nexus with, the arrangement for disposal 
of hazardous substances .... "134 However, the court rejected the de-
fendants' further argument that liability requires specific intent to 
arrange for the disposal of hazardous substances, explaining that the 
Aceto holding undermined the defendants' specific intent argument 
and advanced the purposes of CERCLA.135 Thus, the TIC court rea-
soned that Aceto implicitly rejected a specific intent requirement, and 
128 Id. at 1087. 
129 See id. 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1087 (citing United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
133 Id. 
134 I d. at 1087--88. 
135 Id. at 1088. 
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the court also recalled Aceto's rejection of the notion that generators 
of hazardous substances could "simply close their eyes" to their dis-
posal to avoid liability for response costS.136 
The TIC opinion found additional support for Georgoulis' liability 
in Gurley, which held an individual employee liable as an operator 
where there was authority to dispose of hazardous waste and that 
authority actually was exercised.137 The TIC court extracted from 
Gurley a statement that "perhaps persons who are officers, directors, 
or shareholders are more likely [than a mere employee] to cause a 
company to dispose of hazardous wastes."138 The circuit court stated 
that accepting the defendants' argument that Gurley imposes a spe-
cific intent requirement would violate the goals underlying CERCLA 
by creating a loophole for corporate officials like Georgoulis, who, 
although controlling virtually every major aspect of a company, would 
be encouraged to turn a blind eye to the company's hazardous waste 
disposal practices.139 Meanwhile, the employee actually performing 
the disposal activities could not avoid personal liability, even if he or 
she had no meaningful decisionmaking authority.14o 
Based on its understanding of CERCLA and its analysis of case law 
from the circuit, primarily Aceto and Gurley, the TIC court concluded 
that § 107(a)(3) arranger liability does not impose a specific intent 
requirement as contended by defendants.14l The court decided that a 
corporate officer or director142 is subject to direct arranger liability if 
136Id. 
137 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088 (citing United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994». 
138Id. (citing Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1194). 
139Id. at 1089. 
140Id. 
141Id. 
142 Earlier in the opinion, the TIC court had noted specifically Georgoulis' status as a share-
holder in TICI and TICU. See TIC 68 F.3d at 1084 ("Georgoulis was, at all relevant times, the 
sole shareholder of TIC I and TICU."); Id. at 1088 (distinguishing Georgoulis from the defendant 
in Gurley who was a "non-officer, non-director, non-shareholder employee.") (emphasis added); 
Id. at 1089 (" ... he was an officer, director, and shareholder ... "). However, except in circum-
stances covered by the common-law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, shareholders as such 
have no control over the operations of a corporation. BALLANTINE, supra note 7, § 122. In 
addition, the TIC court's analysis of the defendants' liability is based upon their active involve-
ment in the affairs of WFE as directors and officers, not upon their status as shareholders in 
WFE. See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088-93. It is not likely a court would hold an individual shareholder 
liable under CERCLA without extensive involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the corpora-
tion. See Oswald, Bifurcation of Owner and Operator, supra note 2, at 227 n.17 ("every case 
imposing liability upon an individual shareholder has involved an active shareholder of a closely-
held corporation. The liability of these individuals is more correctly based in their actions as 
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he or she possessed actual authority to control and did in fact exercise 
"actual or substantial control, directly or indirectly" over hazardous 
waste disposal practices.143 The court attempted to clarify this by 
explaining that to be liable, "the exercise of control must be causally 
related to the arrangement for disposal . . . rather than merely the 
operations or activities of the ostensible arranger."l44 By this "actual 
exercise of control" standard, the TIC court purported to protect the 
typical corporate officer, who, although having the authority to control 
hazardous waste disposal practices, in actual practice had delegated 
away the real exercise of that authority.145 
b. The Defendants' Liability 
In this case, the TIC court observed, Georgoulis did not delegate 
any substantial decision-making authority, but rather, personally and 
completely controlled virtually every significant aspect of WFE's op-
erations.146 Based on its review of the record, the TIC court found that 
Georgoulis' complete control ofWFE left its employees with no mean-
ingful decision-making power and "inexorably" led to continuation of 
the relatively inexpensive hazardous waste disposal arrangements at 
the nearby dumpsite.147 Georgoulis had, therefore, exercised "substan-
tial indirect control over the disposal arrangement."l48 Accordingly, 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that Georgoulis 
was directly and personally liable under CERCLA § l07(a)(3) as an 
arranger. 149 
In addressing the liability of TICI and TICD, the TIC court re-
jected the trial court's holding that they were liable as arrangers and 
instead applied the same standard of "actual or substantial control, 
directly or indirectly" over hazardous waste disposal arrangements 
officers of the corporation, not in their status as shareholders." [citations omitted]). Such 
extensive involvement is not typical of shareholders in widely-held corporations. See BALLAN-
TINE, supra note 7, § 122. Therefore, it is exceedingly unlikely that shareholders in a widely 
held corporation would be held liable by any court for the hazardous waste disposal practices 
at that corporation's various plants. See Oswald, Bifurcation of Owner and Operator, supra note 
2, at 227 n.17. 
143 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. 
144 Id. at 1089 n.7. 
145 See id. at 1089. 
1461d. at 1090. 
1471d. 
148 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. 
1491d. at 1091. 
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as was used to determine Georgoulis' liability.150 The various docu-
mented relations apparent between TICI, TICU and WFE consisted 
solely of certain specific financial services TICI and TICU had per-
formed for WFE.l5l Based upon the circuit court's review of the re-
cord, there was not sufficient evidence to establish as a material fact 
beyond dispute that the government was entitled to summary judg-
ment on the issue of TICI and TICU's liability as arrangers.152 
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE TIC DECISION 
A. A Flawed Standard of Liability Arises from the 
Court's Analytical Structure 
The government's argument, in TIC, was basically that the court 
should follow the authority to control standard,153 while the defen-
dants essentially argued for the actual control standard.154 Although 
the court's language of "actual or substantial control, directly or indi-
rectly" blurred the distinction between the two liability standards, 
the defendant's liability clearly was not based on any showing of his 
personal or actual participation in WFE's disposal of its hazardous 
wastes.155 The TIC court, instead, held Georgoulis liable based upon 
150 I d. at 1092. 
151 See id. 
152Id. at 1089. 
153 The government does not provide a convenient label, like "authority to control," for its 
proposed standard of liability of arrangers under § 107 (a)(3). See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. The 
government argued, however, for arranger liability based upon general involvement in daily 
operations of the company, without the necessity for showing involvement in actual arrange-
ments for disposal of hazardous substances. See id. This criteria for liability equates to the 
authority to control liability standard discussed in Section II of this Comment. See supra notes 
47-50 and accompanying text. 
154 Because the court wrote without significant reference to the development of CERCLA 
liability by other courts and the resulting discussion by legal commentators, the language of the 
TIC opinion failed to conform to previously developed terms of art. See infra note 157 and 
accompanying text. The defendants' argument, however, that liability as an arranger requires 
that a person take some intentional action to arrange for disposal of a hazardous substance, 
equates to the actual control standard discussed, supra in Section II of this Comment. Compare 
TIC, 68 F.3d at 1087 (defendants' argument for liability based on "some intentional action to 
arrange for the disposal of a hazardous substance"), with United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 
811,825 (3d Cir. 1995) (requiring actual control of liability-creating conduct to impose liability). 
155 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090 ("The lack of evidence showing that Georgoulis was personally 
involved in, or aware of, the details of the disposal arrangement does not bar his liability."). 
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his "substantial indirect control" over WFE's hazardous waste dis-
posal arrangements.156 
Part of the TIC decision's analytical murkiness may be due to its 
structure. Except for a single footnote that merely listed cases and 
paraphrased their holdings, the court did not discuss or refer to 
CERCLA liability cases decided in other circuits to support its rea-
soning.157 The TIC court substantially neglected past cases addressing 
liability under CERCLA of corporate officers and parent corpora-
tions, and the discussion of many legal commentators on that sub-
ject.158 As a result, the court's discussion of arranger liability fails to 
confront adequately the inherent conflict between its liability stand-
ard-based on "substantial, indirect control"-and the principle of 
limited liability which is fundamental to corporations law.159 A more 
complete and proper analysis would have concluded that liability 
under § l07(a)(3) of CERCLA requires actual participation or in-
volvement in the arrangements for disposal of hazardous wastes.160 In 
creating a liability standard which does not require actual control of 
the disposal of hazardous wastes, the Eighth Circuit's holding is based 
on a flawed analysis of CERCLA's text and legislative history and 
case law in the Eighth Circuit.161 
156 Id. 
157 See id. at 1091 n.9. (citing cases concerning direct liability of parent corporations as 
"operators" under CERCLA § 107(a)(2)). First, the TIC court, based upon the holding in United 
States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 807-09 (8th Cir. 1995), characterized the standard for 
such liability in the Eighth Circuit as requiring "authority to control and actually or substan-
tially controlling the facility at which the disposal occurred, ... " Id. Then, the TIC court cites 
cases from other circuits that adopted "similar" standards. Id. (citing Lansford-Coaldale Joint 
Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221-22 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1993); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. 
v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 
F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1990)). However, the cited cases actually seem to require actual partici-
pation and involvement in hazardous waste disposal activities, not actual or substantial partici-
pation-as established by the Eighth Circuit. Compare Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26-27 (requir-
ing active involvement in activities of subsidiary for parent corporation to be liable under 
§ 107(a)(2)) with TIC, 68 F.3d at 1090 (imposing liability based upon "substantial indirect" control 
over hazardous waste disposal arrangement without evidence of actual involvement). Note 9 of 
the TIC opinion concludes by noting two other minority standards for operator liability. TIC, 
68 F.3d at 1091 n.9 (citing Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 584, 590-91 (6th Cir.), vacated, reh'g en 
bane granted, 67 F.3d 586 (1995)). Other than this brief listing of holdings, the TIC court fails 
to discuss or develop the relationship of its standard of "actual or substantial control, directly 
or indirectly" to the liability standards of other circuits. See id. 
158 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
159 See generally supra notes 7-17, 38-42 and accompanying text. 
160 See id. 
161 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088-89. 
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B. Legislative History and CERCLA's Goals 
1. Assumption that CERCLA Imposes an Active Duty to Prevent 
Improper Disposal of Hazardous Substances 
The TIC court asserted that its holding furthered the legislative 
goals behind CERCLA.162 However, the circuit court did not refer to 
CERCLA's legislative history, other than to cite approvingly the trial 
court's statement that "Congress's goals" in enacting CERCLA were: 
"(1) to ensure that those responsible for the problems caused by 
hazardous wastes are required to pay for the clean-up costs ... and 
(2) to ensure that responsible persons are not allowed to avoid liability 
by remaining idle."163 Actually, the trial court had characterized these 
not as "Congress's goals," but as "[t]he recognized purposes of CER-
CLA legislation."l64 The circuit court's phrase "Congress's goals" seems 
to imply reference to either the language of the statute itself, or at 
least its legislative record.165 However, the phrase "recognized pur-
poses" actually used by the trial court refers to judicially recognized 
purposes and to the cases cited for authority.166 
Careful parsing of the legislative goals that the TIC circuit court 
attributed to CERCLA is enlightening. The first goal, ensuring that 
those responsible for the problems of hazardous wastes are required 
to pay for cleanup costs, is supported by CERCLA's legislative re-
cord.167 The second goal cited, however, ensuring that responsible 
persons are not allowed to avoid liability by remaining idle, was not 
drawn from the statute or its legislative record, but was a paraphras-
ing by the trial court of the justification invoked in Nurad, Inc. v. 
William E. Hooper & Sons Co. when the Fourth Circuit adopted the 
widely criticizedl68 authority to control standard of CERCLA liabil-
162 See id. at 1089 (dismissing defendant's argument by stating that "such a holding would 
violate the goals underlying CERCLA," and stating that its holding is "based upon our under-
standing of CERCLA"). 
163Id. at 1088 (citing United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1173, 1177 (N.D. 
Iowa 1994». 
164 TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1177. 
165 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088. 
166 See TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1177. 
167 H.R. REP. No. 253 (III), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3038,3038 (Congress tried to achieve two general goals by passing CERCLA: "(1) to provide 
for cleanup if a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is 
threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups."). 
168 Before TIC, the authority to control liability standard had been followed by only the Fourth 
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ity.169 Therefore, ensuring that "responsible persons are not allowed 
to avoid liability by remaining idle" is not, as characterized by the TIC 
circuit court, a congressional goal drawn from CERCLA's text or 
legislative history, but an attempt by one federal circuit, to justify an 
over-inclusive standard of liability; a liability standard that has been 
rejected roundly by the vast majority of courts to consider the ques-
tion.170 
In addition, the language quoted by TIC implicitly makes an as-
sumption about CERCLA that the majority of courts following the 
actual control liability standard have been unwilling to make.l7l "To 
ensure that responsible persons are not allowed to avoid liability by 
remaining idle" seems to imply that CERCLA imposes an active duty 
on every individual, whenever possible, to prevent the mishandling of 
hazardous substances. l72 The support for this assumption would ap-
pear to be the remedial nature of the statute and its broad goal of 
ensuring that those responsible for the problems of hazardous wastes 
are required to pay for cleanup costS.173 In view of its vague provisions 
and meager legislative history, however, there should be some more 
substantial basis than CERCLA's general aspirations for extending 
its scope beyond its plain language.174 
The assumption that CERCLA does more than hold accountable 
those responsible for hazardous waste disposal problems-that it im-
poses an active duty on all individuals to prevent hazardous waste 
disposal problems-is the conceptual basis for imposing liability with-
out proof of actual control of the waste disposal activities such as the 
Circuit, Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) and the 
Ninth Circuit, Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 
(9th Cir. 1992). See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Even the TIC opinion itself seems 
critical ofthe Nurad holding. See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1091 n.9 (Nurad established CERCLA liability 
based on "mere authority to control.") (emphasis added). 
169 See TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1177 (citing Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845); H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (III) 
at 15. 
170 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088; H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (III) at 15; supra note 39 and accompanying 
text. 
171 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088; supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting defendants' argument as contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA and which 
"would allow defendants to simply 'close their eyes' to the method of disposal of their hazardous 
substances"). 
173 See TIC, 866 F. Supp. at 1177 (citing Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845). 
174 See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cordova 
Chern. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.), vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 67 F.3d 586 (1995). 
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authority to control standard.175 In blithely adopting the justification 
of the Nurad court as one ofCERCLA's goals, it seems inevitable that 
the TIC court would also end up adopting a standard of liability that 
requires a lesser showing than the personal participation needed to 
satisfy the actual control test.176 CERCLA's actual language, however, 
seems to impose liability on persons based upon improper waste 
disposal in which they themselves actually participated.177 
2. Excessive Reliance on Statutory Purpose 
A more thorough analysis of CERCLA also should recognize the 
difficulty in determining the specific, as opposed to the general, goals 
of Congress with respect to liability under CERCLA-a hastily-passed 
statute with ambiguous provisions.178 Therefore, although CERCLA 
should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals as a remedial 
statute, it should not be employed to "fill in the blanks so as to discern 
a congressional intent to impose liability under nearly every conceiv-
able scenario."179 
Congress usually is specific and explicit when it intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept. ISO At 
the time that Congress passed CERCLA, it was a well-recognized 
principle of corporations law that mere control of a corporation, with-
out more, was not adequate grounds for imposing liability on a corpo-
rate officer or director for the actions of other officers, directors or 
employees.181 Instead the principle of limited liability required actual 
participation in the wrongful conduct as a prerequisite for imposing 
personal liability on corporate officers, directors, and employees.l82 
Because of the state of corporate law at the time of CERCLA's 
passing, there should be some support in the statute itself, besides its 
176 See, e.g., NEPACCO I, supra note 3, at 848-49 (stating authority to control is the proper 
standard for CERCLA liability; to hold otherwise "would frustrate congressional purpose by 
exempting from the operation of the Act a large class of persons who are uniquely qualified to 
assume the burden imposed by [CERCLAJ."). 
176 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
177 See Cordova, 59 F.3d at 589 ("Congress intended that those responsible for disposal of 
chemical poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they 
created") (emphasis in original). 
178 See id. at 588. 
179 Id. 
180 United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 824 (3d Cir. 1995). 
181 Id. 
182 See generally 3A FLETCHER, supra note 8, § 1137; Richard G. Dennis, Liability o/Officers, 
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broad remedial goals, for assuming a congressional intention to im-
pose liability on corporate officials merely because of their general 
control of routine business activities.183 The sparse legislative history, 
however, indicates that Congress anticipated that "issues of liability 
not resolved by this Act . . . shall be governed by traditional and 
evolving principles of common law."184 Based on these considerations, 
the courts should impose liability only on those persons, corporate or 
otherwise, who Congress clearly made liable-those who actually 
participate in the processing of hazardous wastes.185 
3. CERCLA's Structure-Liability Based on Action as Opposed 
to Status 
In addition to lacking support in CERCLA's legislative history and 
relying excessively on CERCLA's broad remedial purpose, the TIC 
court fails to understand the differences between liability under the 
differing subsections of CERCLA. The few courts to adopt liability 
based on "authority to control," rather than the personal participation 
required by the actual control standard, have done so in the context 
of liability of owners and operators of a hazardous waste site under 
CERCLA §§ 107(a)(1) and (a)(2), not arrangers or transporters under 
CERCLA §§ l07(a)(3) and (a)(4).186 
There is, however, a structural difference in CERCLA between 
liability under §§ 107(a)(1) and (a)(2) and liability under §§ l07(a)(3) 
and (a)(4).187 Liability as an owner or operator under §§ 107(a)(1) and 
(a)(2) is based upon a party's status as owner or operator, not any 
specific conduct or actions.188 In contrast, liability of arrangers and 
transporters under §§ 107(a)(3) and (a)(4) is based upon a party's 
Directors and Stockholders Under CERCLA The Case for Adopting State Law, 36 VILL. L. 
REV. 1367, 1411 (1991). 
183 USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 822. 
184 Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 16, at 590 n.41. 
185 USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 822. 
186 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 
1992); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992). 
187 See USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 824 n.25. 
188 Id. It is possible to argue, as in Gurley, that operator liability is not based on status but, 
as with arrangers and transporters, on specific actions or conduct. See United States v. Gurley, 
43 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1994). That perspective, however, also seems to lead to a requirement 
of actual personal participation in the operations creating the liability, as with the actual control 
liability standard. See id. ("These definitions connote some type of action or affirmative conduct, 
an element not required by those courts that ask only whether a defendant had the authority 
to control the operation of the facility"). 
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actions.189 Even assuming that authority to control is justifiable as the 
proper standard for assessing liability on a person with the legal 
status of "owner" under §§ 107(a)(1) and (a)(2), that same standard 
may not necessarily be justifiable for assessing liability based on 
specific actions as required for "arranger" liability under § 107(a)(3).190 
In fact, liability based on specific actions, such as arranging for the 
disposal of hazardous substances, apparently would require a showing 
that the allegedly liable party actually took those specific actions.191 
C. TIC's Misreading of Eighth Circuit Case Law 
1. Trial Court's Misapplication of NEPACCO II 
The TIC circuit court opinion is burdened further by its question-
able analysis of Eighth Circuit CERCLA case law, beginning with a 
failure to correct the TIC trial court's misreading of NEPACCO II.192 
In NEPACCO II, the issue of ownership or possession of the hazard-
ous substances was central to the dispute.193 NEPACCO's vice-presi-
dent personally did not own or possess the hazardous substances; 
rather, the hazardous wastes were owned or possessed by the corpo-
rate entity, NEPACCO.194 The vice-president argued, therefore, that 
he could not be held individually liable for having arranged for the 
transportation and disposal of hazardous substances under § 107(a)(3), 
even though he actually made the specific arrangements for waste 
disposal.195 
The NEPACCO II court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that defendant's actual control over NEPACCO's hazardous 
wastes satisfied the possession requirement.l96 Although the NEPACCO 
II court stated, without elaboration or citation, that it was "authority 
to control ... disposal of hazardous substances that is critical under 
189 USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 824 n.25. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 See United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1995), cen. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 50 (1996); United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (N.D. Iowa 
1994). 
193 See NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 743-44; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) ("imposing liability for 
response costs as an arranger on any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person.") (emphasis added). 
194 NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 743. 
195 [d. 
196 [d. 
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the statutory scheme," the defendant's liability was based, in fact, 
upon his actual control over the disposal of NEPACCO's hazardous 
wastes.197 The defendant's actual control was demonstrated by virtue 
of his actions as plant supervisor-he "actually knew about, had im-
mediate supervision over, and was directly responsible for arranging 
for the transportation and disposal of the NEPACCO plant's hazard-
ous substances .... "198 In other words, because defendant had actual 
control over NEPACCO's hazardous wastes, that satisfied the "owned 
or possessed" language of § 107(a)(3), and because defendant exer-
cised his actual control to make the specific arrangements for disposal 
of NEPACCO's hazardous wastes, the rest of § 107(a)(3) was satisfied, 
and liability as an arranger was established.199 However, the TIC trial 
court cited the NEPACCO II authority to control language as stand-
ing for the proposition that showing authority to control was the 
standard required to establish liability as an arranger.200 
To summarize, the authority to control language that the NEPACCO 
II court used in its discussion of ownership or possession of hazardous 
materials was misread by the TIC trial court as a basis for using 
authority to control to establish overall arranger liability.201 That mis-
reading of NEPACCO II by the TIC trial court was the foundation 
for that court's holding Georgoulis liable as an arranger.202 Rather than 
closely scrutinizing the district court's holding, however, the TIC 
appellate court proceeded to examine and reject the defendants' claims 
that the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Aceto and Gurley require a 
showing of actual control of the arrangement for disposal of hazardous 
wastes to be liable.203 
2. Questionable Application of Aceto and Gurley 
First considering Aceto, the TIC appellate court stated that "Aceto 
rejected the notion that generators of hazardous substances could 
simply 'close their eyes' to the method of disposal of their hazardous 
substances to avoid any liability for response costS."204 In Aceto, though, 
the court did not have to confront the difference between the author-
197Id. 
198 Id. 
199 See NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 743. 
200 See United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (N.D. Iowa 1994). 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 50 (1996). 
204 Id. (citing United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
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ity to control standard discussed and the actual control standard that 
in fact was applied in NEPACCO II.205 The defendants in Aceto did 
argue that they should have avoided liability based on NEPACCO II 
because they did not have authority to control the operations at the 
Aidex manufacturing facility.206 The Aceto court, however, brushed 
aside their argument based upon defendants actual legal ownership 
of the hazardous materials at the site.207 
The TIC circuit court also read the decision in Gurley as supporting 
Georgoulis' liability as an arranger, notwithstanding the fact that 
there is no showing that he personally participated in the arrange-
ments for WFE to dispose of its hazardous wastes.208 This interpreta-
tion was a peculiar reading of Gurley, which explicitly rejected the 
authority to control standard for operator liability and required actual 
control to establish operator liability.209 
Despite the Gurley holding, however, the TIC court focused on the 
fact that the liable individual in Gurley was a corporate employee, 
rather than an officer, director, or shareholder.210 The Gurley defen-
dant's argument was that, as a simple employee, he lacked the author-
ity to control the disposal of the company's hazardous wastes.211 The 
Gurley court responded by noting that "officers, directors or share-
holders are more likely to cause a company to dispose of hazardous 
wastes, but we decline to confer immunity on all persons who do not 
hold such positions."212 Gurley therefore rejected liability based sim-
ply on corporate status as employee, officer, director or stockholder.213 
The TIC court, however, merely quoted the language of Gurley and 
stated that officers, directors and shareholders, by virtue of their 
corporate status and authority to control corporate actions in general, 
by their very position are responsible for all handling of hazardous 
wastes by the corporation.214 The TIC decision thus misread Gurley 
to stand for its "substantial, indirect" control standard of liability, 
205 See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381-82. 
206 Id. 
207Id. 
208 See United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 50 (1996). 
209 United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) ("an individual may not be held 
liable as an 'operator' ... unless he or she ... personally perform[ed] the tasks necessary to 
dispose of the hazardous wastes or [directed] others to perform those tasks."). 
210 TIC, 68 F.3d at 1088-89. 
211 See Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1194. 
212Id. 
213 See id. 
214 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. 
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when in fact, Gurley actually rejected this standard based upon status, 
and instead required a showing of specific personal involvement in the 
hazardous disposal arrangements.215 
In summary, the TIC decision relies upon a mistaken reading of 
CERCLA's legislative history, excessive reliance upon its broad re-
medial goals, and mischaracterizations of past Eighth Circuit CER-
CLA case law. Upon this flawed foundation it erects its standard of 
personal liability under CERCLA for "arrangers" of hazardous waste 
disposal. 
D. The Wrong Standard-"Actual or Substantial 
Control, Directly or Indirectly" 
In United States v. TIC Industries, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at last discussed the issue of what 
constituted "arranged for disposal or treatment" within the meaning 
of § l07(a)(3) of CERCLA.216 The court's final standard of liability-
"actual or substantial control, directly or indirectly"-was unclear, 
however.217 The TIC court evidently was trying to craft a liability 
standard that required more than just authority to control the dis-
posal of hazardous wastes.218 Yet Georgoulis' liability was not based 
on a showing of actual direct involvement in WFE's waste disposal 
arrangements, but rather on his "substantial indirect control over the 
disposal arrangement."219 The Eighth Circuit's standard of liability, 
therefore, does not correspond to the actual control test adopted by 
most other circuit courtS.220 
Under the actual control standard, persons with little or no connec-
tion to the disposal of hazardous wastes are not held liable.221 The 
major disadvantage of the actual control standard is that responsible 
215 Compare id. at 1088 ("careful reading of Gurley . .. supports the district court's finding of 
Georgoulis' liability as arranger in the present case") with Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1193 (liability 
requires actual involvement in disposal of hazardous wastes). The TIC court's ability to read 
Gurley as supporting the district court's imposition of liability on Georgoulis is strange consid-
ering that the court makes no effort to reconcile Gurley and its own holding, based on "actual 
or substantial control, directly or indirectly." See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089-90. 
216 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. 
217 See id. 
218 Id. (liability requires "authority to control, and ... actual or substantial control, directly 
or indirectly."). 
219 See id. at 1090. 
220 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
221 See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 825 (3d Cir. 1995) (imposing liability under 
actual control test requires that ''person sought to be held liable actually participated in the 
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persons sometimes will not be liable because no showing can be made 
that they personally participated in, or had actual control over, the 
disposal of hazardous wastes.222 On the other hand, the actual control 
liability standard comports with a straight-forward reading of CER-
CLA's text.223 For instance, to impose liability as an arranger of haz-
ardous waste disposal under § 107(a)(3), the actual control standard 
requires that a person actually participated in the arrangement for 
disposa1.224 
In contrast, liability without proof of actual control of the disposal 
of hazardous wastes aggressively advances CERCLA's goal of holding 
persons accountable for the results of improper hazardous waste dis-
posal.225 This result, however, requires that the text of CERCLA be 
given a somewhat strained interpretation.226 For example, CERCLA 
§ 107(a)(3) imposes liability on persons who "arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal 
or treatment."227 Any test that imposes liability without requiring 
proof of personal participation essentially is saying a person "ar-
ranged for" without any proof that they did in fact "arrange for."228 
Imposing liability without requiring actual control of the disposal of 
hazardous wastes, like the authority to control standard does, also 
ensures that sometimes parties without any knowledge of, or involve-
ment in, the disposal of hazardous wastes will be liable for cleanup 
costS.229 
liability-creating conduct"); United States v. Cordova Chern. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 589 (6th 
Cir.) ("Congress intended that those responsible for disposal of chemical poisons bear the cost 
and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created") (emphasis in original), 
vacated, reh'g en banc granted, 67 F.3d 586 (1995). 
222 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. 
223 See USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 824 ("it is appropriate to limit liability to those persons who are 
clearly made liable by the language Congress used-those who actively participate [in the 
handling of hazardous wastes]"). 
224 See, e.g., NEPACCO II, supra note 3, at 745. 
225 See NEPACCO I, supra note 3, at 1179 (adopting authority to control standard to prevent 
"encourag[ing] persons in authority to turn a blind eye to the method of disposal of their 
corporation's hazardous substances"). 
226 See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that authority to 
control standard for liability under CERCLA § 107(a)(2) is inconsistent with the specific action 
or affirmative conduct implicit in the term "operator"). 
22742 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). 
228 See id. 
229 See Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 16, at 618 (corporate officer doing no more than 
hiring licensed transporter to transport hazardous wastes to disposal facility based upon author-
ity to control would be liable for cleanup costs resulting from transporter's negligence). 
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Moreover, liability without actual control also conflicts with the 
established principles of corporations law.230 The limited liability rule 
protects from liability corporate officers, directors and employees who 
do not actually participate in the liability-creating conduct.231 Under 
the authority to control standard, however, there will always be at 
least one corporate officer who will be personally liable.232 After all, 
every corporate facility will have at least one officer with ultimate 
responsibility for corporate operations there.233 
Ironically, holding corporate officers personally liable based upon 
their authority to control corporate actions may actually frustrate 
rather than advance CERCLA's stated goals.234 If an officer becomes 
active in a company's waste disposal arrangements, he may be creat-
ing liability for himself under CERCLA's strict joint and several 
liability scheme.235 One logical way to avoid this personal liability 
would be to avoid any involvement in a company's hazardous waste 
disposal decisions.236 So, rather than fostering greater involvement by 
corporate officials in hazardous waste disposal decisions, the authority 
to control liability standard may actually encourage less such involve-
ment.237 Moreover, the possibility of personal liability may also dis-
courage otherwise qualified officers from serving with companies at 
all involved with hazardous substances.238 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. TIC 
Industries was based on two justifications: (1) its understanding of 
the structure and history of CERCLA, and (2) the court's interpreta-
tion of past CERCLA case law. Both branches of the court's analysis 
were flawed fundamentally-TIe's invocation of CERCLA's goals 
was cursory and incomplete, and the court's analysis of past Eighth 
Circuit cases was questionable and poorly executed. Moreover, the 
court's liability standard conflicts with fundamental principles of cor-
porations law. Although the court seemed to be searching for a broad 
230 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
232 See Oswald, Strict Liability, supra note 16, at 618. 
233 See id. 
234 See Carley, supra note 10, at 259. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
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form of the actual control liability standard, "substantial, indirect" 
control appears functionally equivalent to the widely criticized authority 
to control standard that is rejected by all but a small minority of 
courts. 
In view of the specific facts of the case, the TIC court, despite its 
questionable approach, appears to have accomplished the correct re-
sult.239 The court seems to have been on the right track in its conclu-
sion that arranger liability should require "some level of actual par-
ticipation in, or exercise of control over, activities that are causally 
connected to, or have some nexus with, the arrangement for disposal 
of hazardous substances."240 In this case, Georgoulis' control of WFE's 
day-to-day operations was so complete that he effectively assumed all 
meaningful decision-making authority.241 It could be argued that Geor-
goulis' complete control therefore actually included effective control 
of WFE's waste disposal arrangements.242 It then would be appropri-
ate to hold Georgoulis personally liable for the consequences ofWFE's 
improper disposal of its hazardous wastes.243 
The problem with the TIC decision is in the liability standard it 
created and applied: "actual or substantial control, directly or indi-
rectly."244 The court should have characterized Georgoulis' extensive 
and complete control of WFE as the equivalent of actual personal 
involvement in WFE's waste disposal arrangement. The TIC court, 
instead however, imposed liability on Georgoulis based on his "sub-
stantial indirect control" over WFE's waste disposal arrangements, 
notwithstanding the lack of evidence of his personal involvement in 
that arrangement.245 Thus, Georgoulis' actions and conduct appear 
irrelevant to his liability, which seems based on his substantial authority 
within WFE.246 In TIC therefore, the Eighth Circuit has adopted, in 
effect, an authority to control standard of CERCLA arranger liability.247 
239 See United States v. TIC Investment Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1090 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 50 (1996). 
240 See id. at 1087-88. 
24\ Id. at 1090. 
242 See id. at 1087-88. 
243 See id. 
244 See TIC, 68 F.3d at 1089. 
245 See id. at 1090. 
246 See id. 
247 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying 
CERCLA operator liability based on authority deriving from ability to control disposal of 
hazardous wastes). 
